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Abstract: 
 
Although the immigration policies of Germany and France share a similarly restrictive 
approach, the manner in which migrants protest against such policies and resist against their 
implementation is strikingly different. This is particularly obvious for undocumented migrants. 
In France, collective action of undocumented migrants has received increasing public 
attention over the last two decades, and detention centres have been a foremost target of such 
action. Resistance against detention prior to deportation culminated in achieving the closure 
of the country's biggest detention centre in 2008. To the contrary, undocumented migrants 
have hardly ever protested against their condition in Germany. Although collective action 
against immigration policies has reached a new level with the “Refugee Tent Action” 
occupying public space in Berlin and elsewhere since 2012, it continues to focus mainly on 
the living conditions of asylum seekers, not undocumented migrants. This discrepancy may be 
explained with the existence of different institutional conditions for collective action, i.e. such 
political opportunity structures that refer to state regulations and measures. A comparative 
analysis of these conditions shows that weaker resistance against immigration detention in 
Germany may be due to the existence of comparably more repressive and controlling 
immigration laws, a flexible toleration status that provides its holders with basic social 
security, and the scarcity of options for legalisation. The combination of harsh repression and 
little prospect for legalisation makes resistance appear much riskier. The risks are greater yet 
for holders of a toleration status since its delivery is, to some extent, subject to administrative 
discretion. The toleration status thus tends to divide the people susceptible to engage in 
collective action. The knowledge of these differences may help undocumented migrants and 
their supporters in both countries to develop more effective strategies of resistance against 
restrictive policies. 
 
Keywords: 
 
Undocumented Migration – Immigration Detention – Collective Action – Germany – France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 Christoph Tometten holds an LL.M. in German and French Law from the Universities of Cologne and Paris I 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. He is currently doing his Preparatory Judicial Service Traineeship under the supervision of 
the Higher Regional Court of Berlin and working as a counsellor for immigration and asylum law at the Berlin-
based Contact and Counselling Centre for Refugees and Migrants (www.kub-berlin.org). 
(christoph.tometten@gmx.de). 
RLI Working Paper No.8 
4 
1. Introduction 
 
Research on social movements has dedicated some attention to undocumented migrants and 
tried to determine the factors that condition and influence their collective action to overcome 
the difficulties arising from their situation.
1
 One approach described political opportunity 
structures, i.e. “consistent - but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the 
political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure”.2 As this definition encompasses a wide 
range of aspects, several authors tried to systematise it. McAdam et al identified four 
elements of political opportunity structures, “the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalised political system, the stability of that broad set of alignments that typically 
undergird a polity, the presence of elite allies, the state's capacity and propensity for 
repression”.3 Michels distinguishes between institutional conditions, the presence of allies 
and supporters and politico-cultural conditions. Following this distinction, politico-cultural 
conditions include prevalent conceptions of democracy and pluralism, conflict culture and 
political style, whereas institutional conditions include state regulations and measures related 
to immigration, asylum and citizenship, corresponding control mechanisms and rules for 
political participation.
4
 
 
The latter distinction provides the frame for an analysis of the institutional conditions for 
resistance against immigration detention in Germany and France. For the purpose of this 
article, the notion of immigration detention will be restricted to detention prior to deportation, 
excluding other forms of detention related to immigration, i.e. closed centres and camps for 
asylum applicants, privation of liberty during fast-track procedures (for instance in airports) 
and enforcement of criminal sentences for breaches of immigration law. Resistance will be 
understood as any strategy to avoid and oppose detention. A comparison between Germany 
and France is particularly interesting because – as will be shown – resistance is relatively 
weak in Germany and relatively strong in France, although both countries share political 
systems based on democracy and the rule of law and embedded in the framework of the 
European Union, an active civil society, comparably large numbers of undocumented 
migrants and strong migrant communities. A comparison of the institutional conditions for 
resistance against detention in both countries provides a (partial) explanation of these 
differences. 
 
2. Resistance against detention in France 
 
Although there are examples of political protest by undocumented migrants in France since 
the 1970s,
5
 the emergence of a social movement is linked to the adoption, in 1986 and 1993, 
of tighter immigration laws which, among other measures, restricted family reunion and 
legalisation possibilities.
6
 
 
On March 18
th
, 1996, several undocumented migrants occupied St Ambroise Church in Paris 
                                                 
1
 Ferenczi et al 2011: 71-72; Schwenken 2006: 38-45, 143-156. 
2
 Tarrow, quoted after Schwenken 2006: 38. 
3
 McAdam et al 1996: 10. 
4
 Michels 2010: 25-29. 
5
 Ludwig 2008: 77. 
6
 Blin 2010: 67-68; Laubenthal 2007: 63-66. 
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to publicise their situation and to push for their legalisation. Police evacuated the occupation 
on the archbishopric's request some days later. Legalisation was not obtained but several 
human rights associations, intellectuals and artists declared their solidarity with the 
movement which thus received public attention. However, without significant support from 
outside, around 300 undocumented migrants occupied, on June 28
th
, 1996, St Bernard Church 
in Paris and launched a hunger strike. Thanks to the benevolence of the local priest, the 
archbishopric tolerated their presence. Large demonstrations took place in several cities. The 
government, under pressure, finally evacuated the church without judicial decision, using tear 
gas, on August 23
rd
, 1996. However, 76 occupants were legalised – but four were deported. 
As an emblematic event, the occupation of St Bernard transformed the cause of 
undocumented migrants from a clandestine plight into a steady subject of public discourse 
and created the basis for a movement of those who self-confidently adopted the name of 
sans-papiers: several collectives and a national coordination were founded during and after 
the occupation.
7
 
 
Again in 1997, the movement partially succeeded in opposing tighter immigration laws: after 
the Socialist victory in the 1997 parliamentary elections, the Minister for Internal Affairs 
issued an administrative instruction that allowed for exceptional legalisation on a case-by-
case basis of around 80 000 undocumented migrants.
8
 In the following years, France 
witnessed frequent demonstrations, several hunger strikes and occupations (Apostolic 
nunciature in August 1998; Embassy of Burkina Faso in November 1998) but also an 
ideological divide within the movement between pragmatists who prioritised a case-by-case 
legalisation and idealists opposed to any trade-off on global freedom of movement.
9 
Also, the 
initial ethnic heterogeneity of the movement was soon replaced by smaller collectives 
organised along ethnic lines which up to date mark French politics.
10
 
 
Sarkozy's election in 2007 contributed to place the movement in the centre of public attention 
again. Among other measures, numeric targets were introduced in the French immigration 
policy; to meet these targets, the country witnessed a dramatic increase in identity controls 
conducted in such a systematic way that they were soon perceived as a veritable manhunt 
against undocumented migrants.
11
 As they repeatedly focussed on school children, they 
contributed to make the cause of undocumented migrants more visible to the mainstream 
society. A new provision in French law capacitated the authorities to condition family reunion 
to the results of a DNA analysis and thus created a public opinion widely favourable to the 
cause of undocumented migrants, at least in the big cities. Several collectives reactivated 
their struggle through demonstrations, strikes and occupations (Bourse du Travail, 
                                                 
7
 For a detailed account of the 1996 events, see Blin 2010; Cissé 2002; Laubenthal 2007; Ludwig 2008. 
8
 Circulaire du 24 juin 1997 relative au réexamen de la situation de certaines catégories d'étrangers en situation 
irrégulière, available at: www.bok.net/pajol/concerne/circulaire.html.  
9
 The notion of global freedom of movement describes a world order in which people may freely cross borders 
to take residence in any place which they choose. It does not equate to the abolition of borders, since borders 
may be understood as demarcations for the exercise of (democratic) authority and are thus not necessarily linked 
to the restriction of the movement of people. Supporters of global freedom of movement essentially base their 
claims on the assertion that such freedom is the only solution to address global inequalities effectively and to 
guarantee comprehensive respect for human rights. For further reference, see, among others: Bauböck 2009: 1-
31; Carens 1987: 251-273; Mau 2010: 339-361. 
10
 Cissé 2002: 169. 
11
 Mucchielli 2012: 109. 
RLI Working Paper No.8 
6 
headquarters of French Labour Unions, May 2008 - June 2009).
12  
Many undocumented 
migrants have contributed to the French economy with their work and to the Treasury with 
their taxes and social charges and felt entitled to a right to residence in the country. 
 
This aspect complemented the argumentation of the movement that had so far mostly focused 
on humanitarian considerations. Strikes were primarily directed against the government and 
found, in several occasions, the support of the employers. New administrative instructions 
allowed for a legalisation of undocumented migrants on presentation of an employment 
contract if they had been working in France for a specific  number of years.
13 
The movement 
thus employed political and economic instruments alongside with legal action of allies such 
as the Groupe d'information et de soutien aux travailleurs immigrés (GISTI) which 
successfully challenged several immigration laws in court
.14
 
 
This is the background for the subsequent observations on resistance against detention. The 
French movement reached the detention centres
15
 with Sarkozy's presidency under which 
their number was increased significantly. Since the creation of detention centres in 1984, 
individual resistance against detention and deportation as well as isolated protest took place 
occasionally.
16 Observers noted that “the official discourse reinforced the feeling of injustice 
among foreigners awaiting removal while the increasing hostility of retained people made the 
retention centre staff more and more intractable with regard to any attempt to contest its 
authority”.17 This transformed isolated protest into a movement, especially in two detention 
centres of the Parisian region, Vincennes and Mesnil-Amelot. 
 
In Vincennes, the evasion of a detainee in December 2007 occasioned tight security measures 
within the centre, perceived by many detainees as harassment. In late December, several of 
them launched a hunger strike and refused to regain their rooms at night, which resulted in 
the massive intervention of police. The general situation in France, as described above, 
allowed for news to spread fast outside the detention centres and into mainstream media 
while the government tried to minimise the importance of the events. This did not prevent the 
movement to spill over to Mesnil-Amelot where detainees resorted to several actions of civil 
disobedience: hunger strike, refusal to cooperate and to conform with internal rules, 
destruction of identity documents, installation of posters on windows and fences denouncing 
the perceived hypocrisy of the self-proclaimed home country of human rights. As a reaction, 
the French authorities transferred a leader of the movement to another detention centre from 
where he was released due to a procedural error. Another leader was deported illegally before 
the administrative tribunal decided on his appeal. 
 
Nevertheless, protests continued and escalated in Vincennes. In February 2008, a staff used 
his electroshock weapon against a detainee within the centre facilities and injured him, thus 
making his hospitalisation necessary. Other detainees attempted to set fire to their matrasses. 
                                                 
12
 CGT 2009. 
13
 Tometten 2009: 164-166. 
14
 Blanchard/Fischer 2012: 28. 
15
 In France, administrative detention is termed rétention whereas détention is reserved for judicial detention; 
however, such subtleties in vocabulary deflect from the fact that administrative detention remains one of the 
most serious interferences with personal liberty. 
16
 ASSFAM et al 2010: 60; Barthélémy et al 2009: 243. 
17
 Barthélémy et al 2009: 243 (translation by the author). 
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Police repression was brutal and went on for the next months, in Vincennes and other centres, 
despite criticism by NGOs and Members of Parliament. In this context, the death of a 
detainee in Vincennes, although non-imputable to French authorities, marked the final 
escalation: instead of informing the other detainees on the cause of death (a heart attack), the 
centre authorities tried to restore order through the use of tear gas within the centre facilities. 
This time, the attempt to set fire to several rooms was successful: on June 22
nd
 2008, France's 
biggest detention centre was completely destroyed by the flames.
18
 To this day, French 
detention centres still witness acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations, petitions, hunger 
strikes, arson, self-mutilation and attempted suicide directed against the conditions of 
detention, police violence and the lack of access to information.
19
 
 
3. Resistance against detention in Germany 
 
In Germany, social movements of undocumented migrants have been weak if at all existent. 
Since 1983, the Churches have granted asylum to rejected asylum seekers and people facing 
deportation in a considerable number of cases,
20
 a strategy pursuing the same goals as the 
occupation of churches in France described above and comparable to that movement insofar 
neither legal system officially sanctions such action. However, the German Sanctuary 
Movement differs from the French movement insofar as its impulse came from the parishes, 
not from the migrants themselves.
21  
The Sanctuary Movement also focussed on rejected 
asylum seekers with a toleration status that – although not constitutive of a right to residence 
– prevents them from being deported and entitles them to certain social rights.22 
 
German civil society has generally focused on asylum-related issues and tolerated people, a 
feature often at odds with an approach based on the concept of global freedom of 
movement.23 This is also the case for collective action by refugees within initiatives such as 
the Flüchtlingsinitiative Brandenburg
24,
 Refugees Emancipation
25
 or Women in Exile
26.
 Other 
migrant associations and networks in Germany are mostly concerned with the social standing 
of their communities and/or the politics in their countries of origin.
27
 It remains to be seen 
whether the situation has evolved with the Refugee Tent Action
28
 initiated by asylum seekers 
from Bavaria in 2012 and supported by various groups such as the Caravan for the Rights of 
                                                 
18
 See Barthélémy et al 2009: 233-246; Commission nationale sur les rapports entre les citoyens et les forces de 
sécurité, sur le contrôle et le traitement de ces rapports par l’institution judiciaire 2008: 8-10. The Vincennes 
detention centre opened again in December 2008, with 60 places instead of 280 (Cimade 2009: 139). 
19
 ASSFAM et al 2010; Cimade 2008; 2009. 
20
 Hunold 2009: 132; Nagel 1995: 20-24. 
21
 Morgenstern 2003: 327. 
22
 Bell/Skibitzki 1998: 11; Grefen 2001: 21; Morgenstern 2003: 134. 
23
See Breyer 2011: 280-281. Exceptions include the Kontakt- und Beratungsstelle für Flüchtlinge und 
MigrantInnen in Berlin, founded in 1983 (www.kub-berlin.org), kein mensch ist illegal! (www5.kmii-koeln.de) 
founded in 1997 and several initiatives which promote access to healthcare for undocumented migrants such as 
the Büro für medizinische Flüchtlingshilfe in Berlin, founded in 1996 (www.medibuero.de). 
24
 www.fi-b.net. 
25
 www.refugeesemancipation.com. 
26
 womeninexile.blogsport.de. 
27
 Schwenken 2006: 131. 
28
 www.refugeetentaction.net. 
RLI Working Paper No.8 
8 
Refugees and Migrants
29
 and The Voice Refugee Forum
30
. Although it shares, at its core, 
claims related to asylum and the toleration status with the aforementioned actors, its march to 
Berlin and the subsequent (and ongoing) occupation of two of the capital's squares since 
October 2012 became the theatre of a broader claim for global freedom of movement and the 
cessation of all deportations that resemble the positions of the French sans-papiers 
movement.
31  
This similarity is even more striking not only because marches and 
demonstrations are instruments of protest employed in France for many years, but also 
because some of its members resorted to hunger strikes; moreover, supporters of the sans-
papiers collective of Calais participated in the protesters' activities in Berlin. 
 
Aside from the recent Refugee Tent Action, whose impact has yet to be assessed, two more 
examples for collective action of undocumented migrants are worth to be mentioned. First, 
Respect
32
 is a Berlin-based collective of undocumented migrant women household workers 
that was founded in 1998 following a European mobilisation of household workers initiated 
in Britain. It calls for the recognition of household work as a professional activity, the 
enforcement of labour rights, a secure access to healthcare and education without deportation 
risk and the recognition of foreign professional titles.
33
 However, the movement did not raise 
significant public awareness so far – also because of its narrow focus and regionally limited 
action. Second, the Society for Legalisation
34 
was founded in 2003 with support from several 
initiatives from the political Left with the objective to realise legalisation and freedom of 
movement for undocumented migrants in Germany. It participated in several demonstrations, 
action days and information campaigns realised with the support of other structures, but 
apparently disappeared in 2005. 
 
Notwithstanding the Refugee Tent Action, a social movement against immigration detention 
rooted in the activism of undocumented migrants themselves has been improbable under 
these circumstances. Several local initiatives in Germany placed the struggle against 
immigration detention at the core of their activity but the commitment of their members has 
not spilt over to those susceptible to be detained so far.
35
 There are, however, examples of 
civil disobedience, i.e. individual resistance against detention, although it is often difficult to 
distinguish between conscious disobedience and desperation. Resistance includes appeals 
against detention orders, vocal and written protest, hunger strikes and the refusal to cooperate 
with detention centre authorities.
36 
 However, it never amounted to collective action. 
 
 
4. Institutional conditions as an explanation for the discrepancy between both 
countries 
 
                                                 
29
 www.thecaravan.org. 
30
 thevoiceforum.org. 
31
 Ulu 2012: 1. 
32
 www.respectberlin.org. 
33
 Schwenken 2006: 147-156. 
34
 www.rechtauflegalisierung.de. 
35
 This is confirmed by Rev. B. Fricke, Protestant pastor in the detention centre of Berlin (interview conducted 
by S. Münch and Z. Ferenczi, 10.02.2010), and an anonymous member of the Initiative against Immigration 
Detention in Berlin (interview conducted by N. Wunsch and the author,  6 January 2010), both unpublished. 
36
 Herzog/Wälde 2004: 165. 
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There are only few examples for collective action of undocumented migrants in Germany and 
they did not have a significant impact yet. On the other hand, there is a fully-fledged 
movement in France which contributed to forcing  the French government to change laws and 
regulations. Similarly, there have been isolated cases of individual resistance against 
detention in Germany, but neither a collective action by detainees themselves nor a wide 
public awareness. In France, on the contrary, the sans-papiers movement is closely linked to 
political protest within detention centres, and this protest even led to the temporary closure of 
the country's biggest detention centre.
37
 
 
This discrepancy results from significant differences with regard to the institutional 
conditions for collective action, as the legal framework in Germany makes it harder for 
irregular migrants to organise themselves. 
 
4.1  Repression and Control 
 
German immigration law is stricter in two crucial points: the longer duration of detention and 
the obligation for public administrations to convey information about undocumented migrants 
to the immigration authorities. 
 
German law distinguishes between two forms of detention prior to deportation. “Preparatory 
detention”38 applies to persons susceptible to be expelled from Germany following a criminal 
conviction, subject to two conditions: the decision on expulsion must be delayed for 
unavoidable reasons and the deportation must be significantly impeded without prior 
detention. This detention must not exceed six weeks and is subject to a judicial decision. The 
more relevant “safeguarding detention”39 applies to all other deportable persons. Immigration 
authorities may order it for a period of six months, unless it is certain that deportation cannot 
take place within three months. Administrative orders are subject to appeal to the 
administrative jurisdictions; additionally, the administration must seize an ordinary judge 
with the confirmation of detention without delay, in any case before the end of the day 
following his/her arrest, i.e. within a maximal period of 48 hours.
40
 
 
Detention may be prolonged for another period of twelve months if the detainee frustrates the 
deportation. This is the case if the detainee physically resists to deportation or does not 
cooperate sufficiently with the administration, for example in the effort to obtain travel 
documents.
41
 The proportionality principle restricts the use of detention to the sole purpose of 
ensuring orderly deportation,
42
 making a detention duration of 18 months rare.
43
 Detention in 
Germany is also subject to the general principle of proportionality.
44
 This principle implies 
that the administration has the obligation – subject to judicial review – to consider 
alternatives to detention, provided they are as effective with regard to the purpose of ensuring 
                                                 
37
 It is not my task to judge whether the means employed are justified or justifiable. 
38
 Article 62 (2) of the German Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz). 
39
 Article 62 (3) of the German Residence Act. 
40
 Article 104 of the German Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz). 
41
 Duchrow/Spieß 2005: 333-334. 
42
 Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, 16.05.2007, 2 BvR 2106/05. 
43
 Rev. B. Fricke mentions an average duration of detention of 6-12 weeks in the State of Berlin. 
44
 The Federal Constitutional Court recognises proportionality as a constitutional principle; moreover, it is 
explicitly mentioned in Article 62 (1) of the German Residence Act. 
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orderly deportation.
45
 Deportable persons must be given the opportunity to comply 
voluntarily with the deportation order before detention is ordered,
46
 although exceptions 
apply to this principle. Other alternatives to detention are rarely considered in practice. 
 
In France, detention prior to deportation is limited to a maximum duration of 45 days, unless 
a deportable person is criminally sentenced to an interdiction to French territory (a penalty 
pronounced by the penal judge without equivalent in German law) for terrorism or expelled 
from France for these reasons.
47 
The detention order is subject to appeal within 48 hours to 
the administrative jurisdictions which must decide within 72 hours.
48
 An ordinary judge is 
seized ex officio within five days of the detention and may prolong detention for 20 days; a 
second prolongation for another 20 days is subject to specific circumstances, i.e. absolute 
emergency, a particularly serious threat to public order or a temporary impossibility of 
deportation due to the lack of travel documents, the dissimulation of identity, resistance to 
deportation or unavailability of transport.
49 
As in Germany, detention may only serve the 
purpose of ensuring orderly deportation so that the impossibility of deportation for a period 
longer than 45 days makes detention as a whole illegal.
50 
As an exceptional alternative to 
detention, French law allows for house detention if the deportable person hands in his 
passport; house detention may be accompanied by electronic surveillance in specific 
circumstances.
51
 
 
As the maximal duration of detention in France is shorter than even the average duration of 
detention in Germany, it is quite clear that the German system is more repressive. That 
Germany frequently executes immigration detention in ordinary prisons,
52
 which is not the 
case in France, confirms this finding. Personal liberties are generally more restricted in 
ordinary prisons than in specific detention centres, where detainees usually avail a wider 
range of means of communication and benefit from longer visit hours as well as laxer closure 
regulations.
53
 
 
In addition to that, most public administrations are under the obligation to convey 
information on undocumented migrants to the immigration authorities.
54
 This restricts the 
access of undocumented migrants to public services. Only recently, hospitals and schools 
were exempted from this obligation; however, social welfare administrations are not, which 
makes it extremely risky for irregular migrants to claim their social rights.
55
 This is especially 
                                                 
45
 Duchrow/Spieß 2005: 332. 
46
 Article 62 (3) of the German Residence Act. 
47
 Articles L. 551-1, L. 552-7 of the French Immigration Code (Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du 
droit d'asile). 
48
 Article L. 512-1 of the French Immigration Code. 
49
 Articles L. 552-1, L. 552-7 of the French Immigration Code. 
50
 Article L. 554-1 of the French Immigration Code. The duration of detention has been considerably increased 
from six days in 1981 to 45 days in 2011 (Blanchard/Fischer 2012: 29). 
51
 Article L. 552-4 of the French Immigration Code. 
52
 One may argue that this is a violation of German law, since Article 62a (1) of the German Residence Act 
provides that, as a rule, immigration detention must be executed in specialised detention facilities. 
53
 Sextro/Nissen 2012: 5, 10. 
54
 Article 87 of the German Residence Act. 
55
 Breyer 2011: 351. 
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problematic with regard to healthcare. Most undocumented migrants can neither afford a 
private health insurance nor access public insurance given the impossibility for them to work 
legally. As healthcare for non-insured persons is coordinated by the social welfare 
administration, it is inaccessible without a risk of deportation, unless it is fully paid for or 
provided pro bono.
56
 In contrast, there is no corresponding obligation for public 
administrations in France.
57 
Undocumented migrants who are not publicly insured may thus 
obtain financial aid for medical purposes, the Aide médicale d'État being especially designed 
for this group of people.
58
 
These findings show one aspect under which the institutional conditions for resistance against 
immigration detention are weaker in Germany than in France: a range of instruments of 
repression and control directed against undocumented migrants and potentially if not 
systematically used against them acts as a deterrent to collective action out of fear of 
repression. This is especially the case for collective action against detention. 
 
4.2  Basic social security through a flexible toleration status 
 
The German system contains another legal instrument that acts as a deterrent to collective 
action and confirms the relative weakness of institutional conditions in Germany: the 
toleration status, a short term for “temporary suspension of deportation”.59 More specifically, 
the toleration status inhibits resistance against detention in two ways: as a preliminary 
protection from deportation and detention, it obliterates the need to resist against such 
measures for its holders; concurrently, it entitles its holders to basic social benefits who may 
thus sense the risk – real or not – of social relegation. This second aspect is important because 
the toleration status – although subjectively invocable – is a discretionary and flexible 
instrument for the administration which is largely free to determine its duration: the toleration 
status may be delivered and renewed on a monthly basis for years. 
 
The toleration status is delivered when a regional government orders the cessation of the 
deportation of particular groups or to specific countries or regions for a period shorter than 
six months,
60
 or when the presence of a deportable person in Germany is considered 
important for the purpose  of criminal prosecution.
61
 However, the more common case for 
delivery of a toleration status relates to situations where legal or factual reasons not 
amounting to a right to stay hinder deportation.
62
 Such reasons include the impossibility to 
obtain travel documents for a significant period of time, the lack of transport, the interruption 
of transport routes, temporary medical reasons amounting to an inability to travel and – if 
other conditions for the delivery of a residence permit, especially sufficient financial 
resources, are not met – the presence of close family members in Germany. The toleration 
                                                 
56
 Breyer 2011: 260. 
57
 Breyer 2011: 263. 
58
 Article L.251-1 of the French Code of Social Action and Families (Code de l'action sociale et des familles). 
59
 Article 60a of the German Residence Act. 
60
 Article 60a (1) of the German Residence Act. Reasons for a cessation order may be found in international law, 
based on humanitarian considerations or directed to safeguard political interests of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Recently, cessation orders have been issued nationwide with regard to Syria and – with restrictions – 
to Iraq. Notwithstanding the basic protection that such orders offer to the concerned people, it must be kept in 
mind that deportations to these states would often be illegal anyway, given that many of the beneficiaries of a 
cessation order are entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection. 
61
 Article 60a (2) of the German Residence Act. 
62
 Article 60a (2) of the German Residence Act. 
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status has been criticised for the phenomenon of so-called ‘chain tolerations’ which keep 
people in uncertainty for years.
63 
As a response, a fairly new legal provision now states that 
the toleration status should be replaced by a residence permit after 18 months,
64
 but this is 
rarely applied. 
 
The toleration status entitles the holder to social benefits which fall short of social benefits 
for unemployed persons.
65
 Full access to the employment market is granted after four years 
of toleration; it may be permitted earlier  only in the absence of applicants holding EU 
citizenship or an employment permit, a restriction that equals a total prohibition in practice.
66
 
Holders of a toleration status are, in principle, not allowed to leave the territory of the state 
that they have been assigned to; a breach of this prohibition constitutes a criminal offence
.67
 
 
Despite these restrictions, the situation for holders of a toleration status in Germany is better 
than for those who fulfil the same requirements in France, where deportation does not take 
place but no legal title nor any social rights beyond those granted to all undocumented 
migrants are available.68 There is only one provision in French law which resembles the 
German toleration status: the possibility for the administration to order that a deportable 
person be obliged to reside in a specific area pending a preliminarily impossible 
deportation.
69
 The maximal duration of such a measure is six months, while there is no 
maximal duration in Germany, but no specific (social) rights are provided with the issuance 
of such an order. 
 
It might seem that considering the toleration status as one of the elements of generally weaker 
institutional conditions for collective action in Germany stands at odds with the finding that 
the German system is, under crucial aspects, more repressive and controlling than the French 
system. However, the combined analysis of both findings shows that this contradiction is only 
apparent. On the one hand, repressive instruments hinder collective action by their mere 
existence which results in a widespread fear of massive infringements on the right to personal 
liberty. This may explain the reluctance of undocumented migrants to oppose detention. On 
the other hand, the toleration status provides its holders with basic social and personal 
security which makes resistance against detention appear less urgent (tolerated people will 
not be detained as long as their status is valid) and riskier (because of the danger, real or not, 
that the state suppresses social benefits as a retaliation for undesired political action). 
 
There are two more reasons which support that the toleration status deters collective action. 
One is that its creation divides the group of people without a legal residence, while collective 
action in France benefits from the support of such migrants who are undocumented but non-
deportable for reasons that would entitle them to toleration in Germany. The other reason  is 
that the toleration status makes administrative action appear more humane to the public 
                                                 
63
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64
 Article 25 (5) of the German Residence Act. 
65
 The originally even lower level provided for in the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act 
(Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) violated the German Fundamental Law (Judgment of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, 18.07.2012, 1 BvL 10/10; 2/11). 
66
 Article 10 (2) of the German Employment Procedure Regulation (Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung). 
67
 Articles 61 and 95 of the German Residence Act. 
68
 Barthélémy et al 2009: 200. 
69
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opinion: it is a tool for immigration authorities to take into account a wide range of aspects 
before issuing a deportation order, thereby reducing the impact of arguments against 
detention and deportation rooted in humanitarian considerations
.70
 
4.3  Options for legalisation 
 
Legalisation options also influence collective action of undocumented migrants and 
resistance against detention. Legalisation is to be understood as the acquisition of a lawful 
residence out of an undocumented situation. It does neither encompass situations in which an 
applicant is not required to hold a specific visa to apply for residence,
71
 nor legalisation 
through an asylum procedure. The almost total lack of legalisation options in Germany 
confirms the assumption that institutional conditions for collective action are weaker there 
than in France. 
 
In Germany, legalisation as defined for the sake of this analysis is restricted to two scenarios. 
An undocumented migrant may file a request with the Commission for hardship cases, which 
is established in every state and composed by government and civil society representatives.
72 
This possibility is conditioned to the prior rejection of an application for a residence permit. 
Following a positive decision of the Commission,
73
 the request will be presented to the 
competent authority (usually the State Minister for Internal Affairs). The members of the 
Commission are free in their assessment of a case of hardship but the competent authority is 
not bound by their vote in its decision to grant an extraordinary right to residence.
74 
As the 
Commission assesses every case individually, the hardship procedure is not designed as a 
basis for legalisation of a great number of people but rather as a remedy to specific 
circumstances. This is confirmed by the statistics: on 31 December 2012, 5968 holders of an 
extraordinary right to residence granted after completion of the hardship procedure lived in 
Germany, and 5166 among them had obtained this right more than six years earlier.
75
 
 
The other scenario – for which no statistics exist – concerns the birth of a child in Germany: 
Tolerated persons are not required to produce a long-term visa for the application to a 
residence permit, if its delivery is mandatory.
76
 Mandatory delivery of a residence permit 
only applies in case of marriage and parenthood.
77 
but only parenthood is susceptible to allow 
an undocumented person to obtain a toleration status in the absence of any other obstacles to 
deportation.
78
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The conditions for legalisation in France are not as narrow. Leaving aside humanitarian 
aspects, the cases in which a visa is not required for the delivery of a residence permit 
principally include strong family ties in France, as well as birth and presence in France for a 
certain number of years, subject to specific deadlines.
79
 Article L. 313-11 (7) of the French 
Immigration Code provides wider legalisation options, given  its wording: 
 
 Unless his presence is a threat to public order, the temporary residence permit with the entry 'private 
 and family life' is delivered ex officio to an alien not living in a state of polygamy, who does not belong 
 to the precedent categories or to those allowing for family reunion, whose private and family ties in 
 France, appreciated notably with regard to their intensity, duration and stability, to his conditions of 
 existence, to his insertion into French society and to the nature of his family ties in his country of 
 origin, are natured in a way that a refusal to authorise his residence would constitute a disproportionate 
 infringement on his right to respect for private and family life under consideration of the reasons for the 
 refusal, without requirement [of a long-term visa.]
80
 
 
This provision may be interpreted extensively and rejection is subject to judicial review. In 
2011, 17 345 holders of a residence permit delivered on the basis of this provision alone lived 
in France.
81
 
 
In addition, undocumented migrants may be legalised on a case-by-case basis, subject to the 
appreciation of the competent authority.
82
 This appreciation must take into account several 
aspects not determined by law but partly fixed in administrative instructions of the Minister 
for Internal Affairs. In recent years, these included the duration of the presence in France, the 
employment situation, private and family ties, school attendance of children and knowledge 
of French.
83
 This legalisation option is a substitute to the former right to residence after a 
presence in France for ten years.
84
 
 
According to news reports, these options combined led to around 36 000 legalisations in 2012 
alone, slightly more than in previous years and considerably more than in Germany. 
 
The French system is, if not more open, at least more flexible than the German system, as it 
provides several possibilities for an undocumented migrant to claim a right to residence, 
whereas these are restricted to narrowly defined cases in Germany. This flexibility allows for 
another relevant conclusion: the criteria for legalisation in French law are subject to evolve, 
which makes them more accessible to political pressure.
85
 This underlines why legalisation 
options are an institutional condition for the collective action and resistance against detention. 
If legalisation is a realistic outcome, collective action is a more reasonable struggle and the 
dangers it represents (because it involves making undocumented status public) are less 
significant in the light of its potential achievements. Similarly, the yet greater risks of 
resistance against detention, even through non-violent means, are more reasonable if 
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legalisation is a realistic goal. Thus greater repression and control mechanisms alongside with 
the flexible toleration status designed to handle humanitarian cases and a narrow approach to 
legalisation options result in much weaker institutional conditions for collective action and 
resistance against detention in Germany. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Resistance against immigration detention is a characteristic phenomenon for the social 
movement of undocumented migrants in France but almost non-existent in Germany, which 
can be partially explained by differing institutional conditions. The German legal framework 
hinders collective action by undocumented migrants in several regards. It is more repressive 
and controlling but provides a more comprehensive social protection through for those 
granted with a toleration status, a practice without equivalent in France. This “simultaneity of 
opening and closure”86 is designed in a way that tends to divide the group, contrary to France 
where solidarity between the different groups of undocumented migrants allows them to 
advocate together for a common cause. Collective action in France is also more effective 
because it has led, in recent years, to several legalisations and thus accomplished one of the 
most important short-term goals of the movement. Of course, this condition might be, at the 
same time, cause and consequence of resistance. 
 
Is it therefore granted that collective action has little chance to be successful in Germany and 
that this analysis might, at best, provide the French government with a framework for 
reducing its impact? Such a conclusion would be quite disillusioning. Obviously, if this 
analysis proves right, France could prolong the duration of detention, introduce an obligation 
for public administrations to convey information on undocumented migrants to the 
immigration authorities and create a toleration status. But a comparative analysis may also 
yield to a wider reflection on the efficiency of protest and to the elaboration of stronger 
strategies of resistance. It is not the author's task to formulate such proposals. But he may 
point out that there is much to learn from a transnational approach to migration issues. And 
there are signs already that such an approach becomes self-evident in the struggle of 
undocumented migrants against detention and deportation, for freedom of movement and 
human rights. 
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